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The most contentious issue in the Revolutionary Congress that crafted the 1899
Malolos Constitution pertained to the separation of church and state, which won by
a mere one vote. Until now this episode in Philippine history has not received a
satisfactory explanation, which this article seeks to offer. The debate in Malolos,
as argued here, was profoundly divisive because the two sides were driven by differing visions of national community. A crucial point was the Filipinization of the
Catholic Church, which the proponents of church–state unity championed and which
their opponents sidestepped. Even as the debate raged, however, Aguinaldo’s
revolutionary government acted on the church–state issue out of political expediency. In the end, the issue that Filipino elites could not resolve was settled by US
colonialism, which imposed church–state separation without Filipinization.
Keywords: separation of church and state, Catholic Church, Filipino nationalism,
Spanish friars, Masonry, Mabini, Aglipay

The Revolutionary Congress that convened on September 15, 1898—which Apolinario
Mabini, who became Aguinaldo’s chief adviser, originally conceived to be merely an
advisory body—went on to write a constitution for the fledgling Republic of the Philippines whose independence was declared on June 12, 1898 (Agoncillo 1960, 294–295). In
the Congress’s debate over the new nation’s charter, the most divisive, controversial,
and “energetically debated” (Majul 1967, 153) issue pertained to the relations between
church and state. Interestingly this assembly was meeting within the premises of the
Barasoain Church in Malolos, Bulacan, which was momentarily desacralized and converted to a state legislative arena adorned with numerous Philippine flags.
In the 1960s Teodoro Agoncillo (1960) and Cesar Majul (1967) wrote about this
aspect of the Malolos Congress as part of their larger projects on the Philippine revolution. Since then scholarship on this topic has stalled, with hardly any new work published
in subsequent decades. This article builds on these early writings. However, as shown
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here, the analyses by Agoncillo and Majul of the question of church–state relations were
inadequate, not necessarily in terms of historical sources—with Felipe G. Calderón’s Mis
Memorias Sobre la Revolución Filipina (My Memoirs of the Philippine Revolution, 1907)
serving as the main source,1)—but in the interpretive frame with which they explained
the divisiveness of this issue. Agoncillo (1960), for instance, reduced the Malolos Congress to, in his words, “triumphant conservatism,” offering no satisfactory explanation
for the victory of church–state separation by one vote, a feat that should not be undervalued in a meeting of supposed conservatives. Majul (1967) bequeathed an exhaustive
and very informative narrative, but interpretatively his work was inconclusive, unable to
rise above the deep divide in Malolos. Because of this historiographic gap, the present
discussion links the narrative to an analysis of the imagined community that each side in
the debate propounded. An important aspect of this analytical frame is the desired Filipinization of the Catholic Church, which resulted in a number of contradictions, such as
in the way Pres. Emilio Aguinaldo’s revolutionary government acted on the issue of
church–state relations. In other words, the significance of church–state relations as
debated in Malolos and the events that transpired at that time and in its immediate aftermath had not been analyzed in Philippine historiography. With the benefit of writing in
an age of a more mature Philippine nationalism but with church–state relations remaining
a sensitive social issue, I attempt in this article to examine this significant episode in
Philippine history.
To set the debate in Malolos in context, it is worth recalling that at this time in
Europe there was no separation of church and state, even after most of Northern Europe
had turned over to different variants of Protestantism following the Reformation. In the
case of France, despite the ravages suffered by the Catholic Church in the late eighteenth
century, a fleeting declaration of church–state separation in 1795, and Napoleon’s Concordat with the Vatican that brought the church under the authority of the state, it would
not be until 1905 that France would become the first country in Europe to formally adopt
and sustain the principle of church–state separation through the concept of laïcité (laicism
or secularity). As in the case of nationalism that according to Benedict Anderson (1991)
was essayed by creole pioneers, the principle of church–state separation was formally
invented in the former colonies, particularly in the United States where the Bill of Rights,
specifically the 1791 First Amendment to the US Constitution, established complete
religious freedom. The exact metaphor of “the wall of separation between church and
state” in reference to the First Amendment was derived, as is well known, from a letter
1) Like Agoncillo (1960), Majul (1967), Zafra (1999), and others, I rely heavily on Felipe G. Calderón’s
(1907) memoirs, which contains an appendix that offers a fair and useful account of the debates in
Malolos.
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of Thomas Jefferson written in 1802. In Mexico the issuance in 1859 of the Ley Lerdo
was seen as establishing separation of the hostile kind, for its purpose was to compel the
Catholic Church as well as municipal and state governments to sell landed properties,
with these entities permitted to retain ownership only of buildings that were directly
used for their operations. In this light, the debate in Malolos in 1898—with the Philippines in the throes of being a postcolony—was relatively early when seen from the
perspective of Europe and even global history.2)
Theoretically the separation of church and state is often seen as a structural concomitant of the spread of rationalization, the rise of religious pluralism, and the growing
dominance of the state in social life. Although the separation of church and state has
often been seen as part of a simple linear development, this view is ahistorical. The
multiplicity of different arrangements in the relations between church and state around
the world—from a situation in which the state is subject to religious authority (theocracy)
to a state with an official religion (protected, supported, and/or controlled in variable
ways), to friendly, indifferent, or hostile separation—suggests that these relations change
and evolve in ways specific to the historical dynamics of particular social formations. In
the Philippines the late nineteenth century provided a complex set of conditions that
made a debate on this issue possible, specifically in the context of the Malolos Congress.
However, as shown here, the separation of church and state eventually occurred not as
the outcome of an autochthonous process of structural social change but as an imposition
by an imperial power.
The sections that follow this introduction provide an overview of the Malolos Congress and the principal contenders. Subsequent sections contextualize the debate in
Malolos through a discussion of the Catholic Church in the Philippines in the nineteenth
century, which was beset by an internal controversy over the control of parishes that
eventually spilled over and stimulated Filipino nationalism in the last two decades of that
century. The critique of Spanish friars was a preponderant concern of the nationalist
movement. Yet, the intelligentsia did not directly address the nation’s relationship with
the Catholic Church itself and neither did they examine the prevailing unity of church
and state under the Spanish dictum of the Patronato Real (Royal Patronage). Malolos
provided the venue for this singular debate in Philippine history. The arguments advanced
by both sides, both with their respective limitations, are presented in later sections. The
article concludes with an analysis of what the two sides represented and their irreconcilable difference, which, as the epilogue discusses, was settled by the US imposition of its
2) Catholicism was disestablished as recently as 2009 in Bolivia, 1987 in Haiti, and 1985 in Italy; it
remains the official or state religion in Argentina, Costa Rica, Liechtenstein, Malta, and Monaco.

NII-Electronic Library Service

Kyoto University

282

AGUILAR

colonial policy on church–state separation, a process that brought to the fore some legacies of the contending ideas in Malolos.

Malolos: An Overview
In his Memorias Calderón (1907, 234–236) recounted that the committee tasked to prepare a draft constitution received two versions, one prepared by Mabini (said to have
been patterned after the Spanish constitution) and another by Pedro Paterno (also averred
to have been copied from the Spanish constitution, and actually prepared by Ricardo
Regidor). It should be noted that the Spanish constitution of 1869—the first “liberal”
constitution since 1812 and a product of the Glorious Revolution that deposed Isabella
II—upheld the principle of a national religion, but it also permitted the practice of other
religions, especially among foreigners.3) However, unlike the Spanish charter, Mabini’s
constitutional program declared religious freedom and disavowed any state religion.4)
Calderón believed that most delegates personally liked Paterno but disliked Mabini,
3) Calderón (1907, 235) referred to the Spanish Constitution of 1868; it should be 1869. Article 21,
Title 1, of the 1869 Spanish Constitution stated that the practice of Catholicism and its ministers
would be “maintained” by “the nation,” although the practice of other religions, especially by foreigners, was also guaranteed:
The Nation is obliged to maintain the worship and the ministers of the Catholic religion. The
public or private practice of any other religion is guaranteed to all foreign residents in Spain
without restrictions other than the universal rules of morality and law. If some Spaniards
profess a religion other than the Catholic religion, everything contained in the preceding paragraph [sentence] is applicable to them.
The loose phrasing of the 1869 Constitution was reversed in the charter of 1876, which restored
the Spanish monarchy under Alfonso XII and created a parliament that was alternately under the
Liberal and Conservative parties. Article 11, Title 1, of the 1876 Constitution declared unequivocally
that Roman Catholicism was the state religion:
The Roman Catholic Apostolic religion is the religion of the State. The Nation is obliged to
maintain this worship and its ministers. However, none in Spanish territory will be molested
for their religious opinions or the practice of their respective religions, as long as they accord
due respect to Christian morality. Nevertheless, ceremonies or public demonstrations other
than those of the State religion will not be permitted.
4) Under Title 1, Article 12 of Mabini’s draft charter stated (Mabini 2011, 131–132):
The Republic as a collective entity does not profess any religion, leaving this matter to the
conscience of the individual who will be free to select the religion that he believes is most noble
and logical.
Thus no one may be persecuted for his religious beliefs or for the practice of his faith within
the Philippine territory, unless this violates universal morality.
Nevertheless, public manifestations of a religious nature may not be carried out without a
license from the local authority.
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so he made it appear that what he would present to the Congress was Paterno’s draft
with some revisions. But, hurriedly, he prepared an entirely different document, which
he claimed to have patterned after South American constitutions, particularly that of
Costa Rica.5)
On October 8 Calderón’s draft was submitted to the committee and approved with
some modifications, although it was opposed by a faction that Calderón referred to as
“Mabini’s partisans” (ibid., 236). Subsequently, on October 21, copies of the draft were
distributed to the delegates. Debates and voting on the articles commenced in late
October and lasted until November.
Title 3 on religion was among the early provisions of Calderón’s draft constitution
that would have been tackled on October 28, but given its contentiousness and the protracted debate it was expected to consume the delegates agreed to defer the discussion
till the last (ibid., Appendix CR29). There could have been other options in dealing with
the fraught relationship between church and state, as native elites held various views
that ranged from absolute adherence to total repudiation of the Catholic Church. Many
who were antifriar remained loyal to the church. “Besides the doctrinaire anticlericals,
there were also those in the government or the congress who wanted clerical cooperation, but who cared, or understood, little about problems of doctrine or ecclesiastical
jurisdiction and were determined to bring the Church under state control” (Schumacher
1981, 76). In Malolos, however, the debate was polarized into Calderón’s proposal on
the union of church and state and the opposing amendment introduced by Tomás del
Rosario, Felix Ferrer, M. del Rosario, Arcadio del Rosario, and Cecilio Hilario. This
amendment reduced the three articles in Title 3 to one article that declared, “The State
recognizes the freedom and equality of all religions, as well as the separation of the
Church and the State” (El Estado reconoce la libertad e igualdad de todos los cultos, así
como la separación de la iglesia y el Estado) (Calderón 1907, Appendix CR28).
The Congress returned to the issue of church–state relations on November 22 (ibid.,
Appendix CR70). Two days later Calderón continued his argumentation, but a number
of “interruptions” by Tomás del Rosario were recorded. When the Congress met again
on November 29 Calderón resumed his peroration; Joaquin Gonzales would have spoken
also in favor of church–state unity but relinquished his turn in order that the delegates
could vote on the issue (ibid., Appendix CR91–92). This faction was probably confident
of having the numbers. It was agreed that votes would be cast by secret ballot. At the
precise moment when the casting of ballots was to take place, a group of delegates against
the principle of state religion headed by Antonio Luna entered the session hall (Agoncillo
5) See note 12 for the provision on religion in the constitution of Costa Rica.
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1960, 305; Calderón 1907, 243). When the votes were counted, the result was a tie, each
side garnering 25 votes (Calderón 1907, Appendix CR92). Among proponents of church–
state unity, there was dissatisfaction that Pedro Paterno, the presiding officer, did not
cast his vote. A small debate on the assembly’s internal rules ensued, which was settled
by holding a second round of voting. This time Pablo Tecson, one of the assembly’s
secretaries who had abstained in the first round, voted, effectively breaking the tie and
enabling the amendment on church–state separation to triumph in Malolos by one vote
(ibid.).6)
The completed draft was submitted to Pres. Emilio Aguinaldo, who temporized as
he weighed his political options. On January 25, 1899 the Constitución Política de 1899,
popularly known as the Malolos Constitution, was finally proclaimed, but modified by a
set of transitory provisions. However, in less than a fortnight, on February 4, 1899,
fighting erupted between US and Filipino troops. The Philippine Republic officially
declared war on the United States on June 2, 1899, but US might cut short the republic’s
existence.7)

The Principal Contenders
In the 1960s scholars dismissed Calderón’s advocacy of church–state unity as owing to
his irretrievable conservatism. Majul (1967, 156) described Calderón (as well as another
proponent, Manuel Gómez) as “typical Filipino conservatives, weaned and educated by
the Mother Church.” With pretensions to psychoanalytic depth, Agoncillo (1960, 298)
was even more denigrating: “Whether Calderon was aware of it or not, the fact that he
was a grandson of a Spanish friar probably militated against his impulse to provide for
religious equality. Here the conservative mind, deeply rooted in the marriage of Church
and State, came to the surface and protruded like a buoy swaying in all directions but
unable to free itself from its anchorage.”
6) The number of delegates in the Malolos Congress, all members of the native elite, changed over
time. By the end of 1898 there were 94 representatives; 35 had been elected and 59 appointed
(Majul 1960, 167). Note that only 51 votes were cast on November 29, 1898 to decide the question
of church–state relations—roughly 54 percent of the 94 delegates by the end of 1898. Reportedly
some provinces could not elect delegates while others could not send the elected ones to Malolos
because of the unsettled conditions. However, by July 7, 1899, when the Philippine–American was
already raging, there were 193 delegates; of these, 42 were elected while 151 were appointed
(Agoncillo 1960, 276–277).
7) The war officially ended on July 4, 1902. Earlier, Spain’s loss and its cession of the Philippines to
the US was formalized in the Treaty of Paris that was signed on December 10, 1898, coming into
effect on April 11, 1899.
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Calderón (1907, 65) admitted that he had “intimate relations” with the Jesuits, who
taught him at the Ateneo Municipal (he obtained his law degree from the University of
Santo Tomas). In Malolos he “collaborated closely” with Fr. Mariano Sevilla, who had
been exiled in 1872 and held the highest educational attainment among the native priests
(Schumacher 1981, 81). However, Calderón was a more complex figure than the flat
character sketched by Agoncillo and Majul. Like other ilustrados (literally, enlightened)
and many other native elites, Calderón was staunchly antifriar. In last minute talks with
the Spanish general and the Manila archbishop, as US forces were poised to move to the
Philippines with the return of Aguinaldo from Hong Kong in May 1898, Calderón (1907,
68) recalled that “all conciliation with Spain was already impossible.” His narrative stated
that he demanded the immediate withdrawal of Spanish governors from the provinces;
the immediate withdrawal of all friar parish priests and the turning over of parishes to
secular (native) priests; and the promise to break up the monastic estates for sale to the
tenants (ibid., 71–72). Evidently Calderón’s stance concerning the friars was uncompromising. Perhaps for this reason he revered Rizal’s novels. In the law school, the Escuela
de Derecho, that he founded in 1899 (now the Manila Law College), as Teodoro Kalaw
(1965, 33) recalled, Calderón “held special Sunday classes on the works of Rizal, especially on the Noli Me Tangere and the Filibusterismo, which he called his Bible.”
Across the divide was the fiercest advocate of separation, Tomás del Rosario. He
was in Madrid in 1888 when Rizal and Del Pilar had serious disagreements; in the same
year he returned to the Philippines and received successive appointments as Justice of
the Peace, Prosecuting Attorney, and Judge of the Court of First Instance in Manila. In
1896 he was deported to Ceuta, Spain’s enclave on the northwest coast of Africa, where
he was detained for 11 months. After his release in 1897 he returned to the Philippines
(Bolasco 1994, 54–55) and became a major force in Malolos.
In addition to being led by lawyers, both sides of the debate shared a common
antipathy toward the Spanish friars—a hallmark of the ilustrados of this period who, as
the core of the intelligentsia, assumed a critical stance toward the Spanish colonial establishment. However, many of the separationists could be distinguished from the unionists
by their adherence to Masonry. How did Masonry affect the deliberations in Malolos?
That Tomás del Rosario was affiliated with Masonry has been remarked upon a
number of times, as if it were somehow an explanatory factor for the deep division in
Malolos.8) The same has been noted of Arcadio del Rosario, who also vigorously defended
the separationist principle (Majul 1967, 154 n. 3; Bolasco 1994, 55; Agoncillo 1960, 298).
8) On Masonry in Philippine history, see Schumacher (1997, 171–178; 1991, 156–177). On the economic and cultural implications of Masonry, see Aguilar (1998). Cf. the website of the Philippine
Center for Masonic Studies at http://www.philippinemasonry.org, accessed May 26, 2014.
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As Majul (1967, 175) put it, with a good dose of speculation, “some of the proponents of
the principle of separation were Masons who were closely aware of or in contact with the
liberal movement in Spain. As such, they had definite ideas on the problem or possibly
even some commitments.”
What is remarkable is that, although Masonry had inspired the alternative vision of
the imagined community propounded by Tomás del Rosario and others, Calderón (1907,
112, 242) deftly avoided labeling any of his fellow delegates as Masons. He did refer to
a group that he called “Mabini’s partisans” and, in turn, pointed to Mabini as fomenting
“the sectarian Masonic spirit.”
It is worth recalling that at this moment in Malolos José Rizal had been executed
(December 1896); Graciano Lopez Jaena (January 1896) and Marcelo del Pilar (July 1896)
had died overseas in miserable poverty; Andres Bonifacio had been executed by fellow
revolutionaries (May 1897); after Bonifacio’s execution, Emilio Jacinto had refused to
join forces with Aguinaldo; and Isabelo de los Reyes had been temporarily muted
(deported to Spain, jailed in Montjuich in Barcelona, released in December 1897, and
given a sinecure as counselor in the Ministro de Ultramar [Ministry of Colonies] from
1898 to 1901). Mabini was the one nonclerical intellectual who drew the line around
which deep divisions were carved. But, as we shall see, Mabini himself was torn and in
fact would prove himself overwhelmed by the war with the United States.
Notwithstanding his opinion of Mabini, Calderón (ibid., 242)—like other ilustrados—
regarded Masonry as it had developed in the Philippines as “more than an anti-Catholic
sect, [but] a society geared to counteract the power of the friars, not so much as ministers
of a religion, but as agents of a political order, or, rather, as a manifestation of the Spanish
political colonizing power.” In this view friars were not even deemed ministers of religion
but political agents of the colonial state.
Significantly Calderón, who faced the opponents of his proposal on state religion,
was tactful in not considering Masonry as providing explanatory force to the deep division
over the question of church–state relations. In writing his memoirs he had the benefit
of hindsight in knowing that Aguinaldo and Mabini, albeit Masons, deferred the implementation of the separationist principle that won in the Malolos Congress and, as will be
seen below, their actions established a de facto state religion during the tumultuous
interregnum. Nevertheless, Calderón considered Masons as mistakenly assuming that
friar abuses were inherent defects of the Catholic Church (ibid.). Indeed one of the issues
in Malolos was disentangling Catholicism from the Spanish friars.
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Catholicism and the Nationalist Movement
Although Calderón’s antifriar sentiment was consistent with much of the nationalist
movement in the late nineteenth century, his position on church–state unity differed from
those who advocated the opposite scenario in that it articulated a specific vision of the
national community. This vision was built on the fact that the Filipino nationalist movement owed its origins to the struggle between Spanish friars and the secular priests
(creoles and natives) over the control of parishes. This struggle, known as the secularization controversy, commenced in the 1820s when the policy that allowed native secular priests to become parish priests was reversed owing to their lack of preparedness for
their positions and because of the fear stoked by native priests’ participation in the wars
of independence in the Americas. In Manila, starting in 1849, Fr. Pedro Peláez took up
the cudgels for the secular clergy as a matter of right based on canon law. After Peláez’s
death in the earthquake of 1863, Fr. José Burgos pursued the issue but turned it into a
racial one, arguing that Spanish friars treated native secular priests as inferior and undeserving to be elevated as parish priests (Schumacher 1999; 2006; Blanco 2010). Burgos,
along with two other priests, Mariano Gómez and Jacinto Zamora, were martyred in the
wake of the failed revolution known as the Cavite Munity of 1872 (Schumacher 2011).
Situating himself in this revered tradition, Calderón’s (1907, 243, Appendix CR82–
83) defense of church–state unity paid homage to Peláez, Burgos, Zamora, Gómez, and
other priests who were incarcerated, deported, and executed for the sake of the patria,
they being the “principal authors of the reform movement.” The “Filipino clergy” shed
their blood and planted the seed of the movement that culminated in the revolution.
Calderón’s advocacy was rooted in this history; for him recognizing Catholicism as the
state religion would signal that the revolution accorded the pioneers of the nationalist
movement due respect. Based on this particular reading of Philippine history and his
view of the European situation, Calderón regarded religious freedom as historically
absurd and politically inappropriate for the Philippines: “Religious freedom is an impossibility, philosophically considered, an historical absurdity, and a political contradiction,
especially in the Philippines” (ibid., Appendix CR84).
Looking back at this debate in Malolos, Calderón (ibid., 242) wrote, “the power of
the native priests is very well known, and to proclaim the separation of church and state
at those moments was tantamount to putting aside this very valuable element of our
people.” Certainly the role of the native clergy in the rise of Filipino nationalism could
not be denied. In fact Calderón’s position was consistent with, or at least not overtly
contrary to, the Propaganda Movement, which did not campaign against the Catholic
Church per se but only against the Spanish friars.
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The immediate antecedent of the 1896 revolution, the Propaganda Movement articulated the issues confronted by Spain’s colonized subjects. The ilustrados at the forefront
of the movement, particularly Rizal, Del Pilar, and Lopez Jaena, were staunchly antifriar.
In his political tracts, Del Pilar described friar hegemony and the friars’ stranglehold on
native society as La Soberania Monacal (The Monastic Sovereignty) and La Frailocracia
(The Friarocracy). However, the Propagandists, realizing that natives had appropriated
Catholicism as their personal religion, did not publicly denigrate the Catholic Church.
Thus they trained their criticisms on the friars. For a good part of the history of the
Propaganda Movement since its inception in Spain in the early 1880s, its campaign was
for assimilation, particularly for representation in the Cortes. There was an element in
assimilation that suggested Hispanization that in turn rested upon a Catholic identity.
Although the lines were sometimes blurred, the Propagandists emphasized that they
were against the rule of the friars but not against the Catholic Church itself. However,
in one private letter dated March 25, 1889 Del Pilar stated, “I can discern clearly now
that we need the weakening of the Pope” (Maliuanag at naaninaw ko ñgayon kailañgan
nga natin ang hina nang Papa), suggesting further that what “the Pope” (i.e., Catholicism)
had sown in the Philippines was not deeply rooted and therefore the faith of the people
could be easily discredited (Del Pilar 1955, 72–73). Nonetheless, in Del Pilar’s letters
to Blumentritt he took the stand that the struggle against the friars was for the benefit
of Spain and the Catholic Church. For his part, Graciano Lopez Jaena ([1889] 1996, 30,
31) declared in his famous speech delivered at the Ateneo Barcelonés on February 25,
1889 that Filipinos were at war with the friars, but it was not a fight for or against religion
(No es una lucha por la religión ni contra la religión). When Rizal crossed the boundary
lines, he allowed himself to be corrected in print by Blumentritt, a good Catholic but also
morally a liberal, whose prologue to Rizal’s annotated edition of Antonio Morga’s Sucesos
de las Islas Filipinas stated that Rizal confused his attacks on the abuses of the friars with
that of the whole of Catholicism.9) As John Schumacher (1997, 140–142) has pointed out,
Ferdinand Blumentritt’s profession of Catholicism buttressed the ilustrados’ contention
that the periodical La Solidaridad, to which he was an avid contributor, was not against
Catholicism as such but against friar abuses. Evidently Calderón’s (1907, 242) belief that
it was an error to think that the abuses of the friars were “defects” of the Catholic Church
was consistent with the public stance of the Propaganda Movement.
It is noteworthy that the ilustrados did not promote atheism; rather, they continued
9) Blumentritt (1962, xiii) stated in his prologue: “The second point with which I don’t agree is some
unbosoming against Catholicism. I believe that the origin of numerous occurrences regrettable to
religion, to Spain, and to the good name of the European race should be sought in the harsh behavior and abuses of many priests.”
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to profess faith, if not in God, then at least in Divine Providence. Del Pilar (1955, 50)
wrote on March 7, 1889 that “we should not forget that we are no more than mere instruments to be used in the inscrutable designs of the God of peace, who in his eternal Love
will not permit the misfortunes of millions of his creatures to go on forever. Let us praise
heaven and have faith, a strong and resolute faith in the future.” As Rizal himself wrote
on April 2, 1889, “Perhaps you would find it strange that the Calambano, who has mocked
many beliefs and superstitions, should be a firm believer in Providence”; in fact, Rizal
averred that he had “more faith in God than all the friars put together” (ibid., 80). Theirs,
they claimed, was the genuine faith in contrast to the spurious religiosity of the Spanish
friars.10)
Given the nationalist movement’s official stance of being antifriar but not antiCatholic Church, there was no room to question the Patronato Real, by which the Vatican
allowed the Spanish crown to sponsor and financially support Catholic missionary work
in Spain’s colonies and, in exchange, have the deciding voice in the selection of ecclesiastical personnel and the disposition of the local church’s revenues.11) The Patronato
Real underpinned the unity of church and state in the Spanish colonial Philippines.
Only somewhat late in the Propaganda Movement was there a mild questioning of
this union when in September 1892 Del Pilar criticized Gov.-Gen. Eulogio Despujol’s
decree ordering Rizal’s deportation to Mindanao. Rizal was banished for “wresting away
the treasure of the Catholic faith from the hearts of Filipinos,” to which Del Pilar ([1892]
1996, 434) replied, “One should respect the Catholic faith in its proper time . . . but it is
unjust, illegal, and arbitrary to invoke the argument of national integrity for every injury
to the religious elements” (Respétese en buen hora la fe católica . . . pero es injusto,
ilegal y arbitrario sacar el cristo de la integridad nacional por cualquier molestia de los
elementos religiosos). National integrity was to be distinguished from religion. Del Pilar
(ibid.) also pointed to the religious diversity in the Philippines and that religion was not
the social glue, not the basis of social cohesion, within the colony and in the colony’s
relationship with Spain. Even then, Del Pilar, in asking how Rizal’s supposed offense
10) Millenarian movements advanced a similar claim to authenticity of religion in contrast to what they
saw as the friars’ false religion. After Spain’s downfall Papa Isio’s movement on Negros Island saw
itself as the defender of “the holy faith” against “Protestant” Americans; Isio’s dream was to establish a theocratic government (Aguilar 1998, 180–183). For this millenarian movement, church–state
unity was a given. This claim to authenticity could well be not far from the sentiment of Filipino
priests who supported the revolution against Spain, calling it a “holy war” against the Spaniards (cf.
Schumacher 1976, 409; 1981, 53).
11) At best the Propaganda Movement sought to reform the system, such as supporting the proposal
of the Ministro de Ultramar to fix the stipend of parish priests in lieu of the variable 12.5 percent of
the income taxes (cedulas personales) collected in the parish; implemented in 1890, the measure
caused much consternation, according to Del Pilar (1955, 193, 211).
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became one against the state religion, hesitated to question explicitly the existence of or
need for such a state religion.
In general, the Propaganda Movement took the prevailing arrangement in the Philippines as a given. It was assumed that once the goal of expelling the friars had been
attained, the native clergy would step in their place and perform their roles in a social
formation that was essentially the same as the colonial society but for the friars. The
idea of simply replacing Spaniards with Filipinos but with everything else intact undergirded the nationalism of ilustrados.
However, a focal point of ilustrado nationalism was the exclusion of so-called primitive races from the imagined community for whom the Propagandists struggled to gain
civil liberties (Aguilar 2005). For them, the label “Filipino” stood for the dominant
Catholicized and Europeanized native elites. For being deemed unassimilable, the cultural groups represented by Muslims and other highland tribes most of whom had not
converted to Catholicism—and therefore continued to enjoy religious freedom—were
not deemed as part of the Filipino nation. This idea of the nation emanated from a racist
impulse that excluded minority cultural groups. It was this nation that Calderón (1907,
242) had in mind when he argued that the “totality of the Filipinos, even those who
boasted they were Masons and sectarians, were Catholics”; to Calderón freedom of
religion would be “extremely dangerous” as the separation of church and state would
cause an outrage to “the consciences of nearly all” and create “deep division” among the
already divided Filipinos. In this view, the unity of church and state would be a cohesive
force that would bring together the nation, conceived in the specifically ilustrado sense.
In such a society, Catholicism would be the putative social glue.

Calderón’s Proposal on Church–State Unity
Under Title 3, Calderón’s (1907, 241) draft of the constitution declared Catholicism as
the state religion. The original proposal read as follows:
Artículo 5. La nación protege el culto y los ministros de la religión católica, apostólica, roma, que
es la del estado, y no contribuye con sus rentas a los gastos de otro culto.
Art. 6. Podrá ejercerse privadamente cualquiera orto culto siempre que no sea contra la moral y
los bienes costumbres y no atenten a la seguridad de la nación.
Art. 7. La obtención y el desempeño de todos los empleos y cargos de la republica, así como los
pagos de los derechos civiles y políticos, son independientes de la religión de los filipinos.
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[Article 5. The nation protects the worship and the ministers of the Roman Catholic Apostolic
religion, which is the religion of the State, and does not use its revenues to contribute to the
expenses of any other form of worship.
Article 6. Any other form of worship may be practiced privately, provided that it is not contrary to
morality and good custom and does not imperil the safety of the nation.
Article 7. The appointment to and performance of all work and positions in the republic, as well
as the payments of civil and political dues, are independent of the religion of Filipinos.]

Article 5 is unequivocal about Catholicism’s proposed status as “the religion of the
State,” whose ecclesiastical personnel would be “protected” by the state. However,
Article 7 clarified that the state was autonomous from, and not subordinated to, the
Catholic Church; on the contrary, the Catholic Church was dependent upon the state for
protection and support. This provision could be interpreted, even if it was not necessarily Calderón’s intention, as putting the state above the church as in the Patronato Real.
In Article 6, the proposed charter contained an incipient idea of religious freedom
contingent upon the private practice of religions other than Catholicism. This echoed
the spirit of the Spanish constitution of 1869 as well as the Costa Rican constitution.12)
At the same time, it can be seen as an acknowledgment of the existence in the Philippines
of religious practices other than Catholicism. Thus other religions would be tolerated
but these would have to remain in the social margins and without state subsidy, in contrast to the open and state-supported practice of Catholicism. Other religions were
supposed to neither go against morality and the established customs of the people nor
undermine the state’s security. This provision implied the proscription of proselytization,
which could be construed as undermining the nation, conceived irreducibly as a Catholic
nation. In effect, Calderón’s proposed charter would tolerate other religions but these
would be consigned to the twilight zone.
Nonetheless Calderón’s proposal reflected the prevailing policy in the Philippines
in the late nineteenth century. As Marcelo del Pilar ([1892] 1996, 432) stated:
Para la legalidad vigente en el Archipiélago, la religión católica es la religión del Estado, pero
no es obligatoria á los habitantes del país. El código penal de aquella región reserva al catolicismo
12) The current constitution of Costa Rica declares in a single provision: “La Religión Católica,
Apostólica, Romana, es la del Estado, el cual contribuye a su mantenimiento, sin impedir el libre
ejercicio en la República de otros cultos que no se opongan a la moral universal ni a las buenas
costumbres” [The Roman Catholic and Apostolic Religion is the religion of the State, which contributes to its maintenance, without preventing the free exercise in the Republic of other forms of
worship that are not opposed to universal morality or good customs]. See note 3 for the relevant
provision of the 1869 constitution of Spain.

NII-Electronic Library Service

Kyoto University

292

AGUILAR

la supremacia religiosa y el derecho exclusivo á la manifestación pública y propaganda pública; pero
lejos de imponer sus doctrinas ni el ejercicio de su culto, sanciona y garantiza la respetabilidad de
las otras creencias religiosas, á despecho de los exclusivismos del dogma católica. (art. 219 á 227)
[According to the existing laws in the Archipelago, the Catholic religion is the religion of the
State, but it is not obligatory on the inhabitants of the country. The penal code of that region
reserves to Catholicism religious supremacy and the exclusive right to public worship and public
propagation; but far from imposing its doctrines and the exercise of its worship, the law sanctions
and guarantees the respectability of other religious beliefs, in spite of the narrow-mindedness of
Catholic dogma. (Art. 219 to 227)]

This policy could be an indirect admission of Spain’s inability to proselytize all of the
islands’ inhabitants, especially those who lived in remote locations. At the same time, it
mandated respect for their religious beliefs and practices, which did not sit well with the
state’s directive to missionize these communities in a new reducción program conceived
in the early 1880s (Aguilar 1998, 157).13) Amid these realities Calderón’s proposal may
be seen as a reaffirmation of the status quo. It could also have been crafted in view of
the fact that many resident foreigners, especially other Europeans and Americans, were
not Catholics and many native elites had to deal with them in the economic and social
realms. Thus the proposed charter would maintain the status quo except for one fundamental difference: Filipinos would staff and control the parishes as well as the hierarchy
of the Catholic Church.

Filipinization: The Native Clergy as Heir to Power
In the minds of countless native priests as well as of the native elite, the Filipinization of
parishes was the culmination of the secularization movement.14) In Malolos, however,
proponents of church–state unity wanted to push Filipinization not only of the parishes
but also of the hierarchy of the Catholic Church, deemed as the logical outcome of the
struggle for secularization. As Majul (1967, 159) put it, the native clergy “expected to
have a share in the government for which they had sacrificed so much.” In defense
13) On the original reducción that sought to “reduce” converted natives into compact settlements, see
Phelan (1959, 44–49); Rafael (1988, 90–91).
14) In 1898 there were 967 parishes (746 regular parishes, 105 mission parishes, and 116 missions), all
except for 150 or 15.5 percent under the control of the friar orders (Majul 1960, 295 n. 1). In 1845
there were about 700 secular priests, a figure that declined to about 550 in 1875; by 1890 it had
risen to 825 (ibid., 305). Despite the growth in numbers, the secular clergy’s control of parishes
remained basically unchanged. Viewed differently, assuming all secular priests gained control of
parishes, there would remain about 15 percent of parishes that would not be filled.
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against anticlericalism, Schumacher (1981, 81) contended that some of the clergy saw
“the necessity of political participation on their part if they were to safeguard the rights
and interests of the Church.” For varied reasons, members of the native clergy believed
it had a birthright not only to ecclesiastical power but to political participation as well.
Moreover, Calderón (1907, 242–243) had a pragmatic concern. The establishment
of an official church would be a tactical device to ensure that the Philippine state would
name the heads of religious orders; if there would be separation of church and state, he
contended that the Vatican would be in a perfect position to name “foreign bishops and
ecclesiastical authorities and absolutely disregard the native clergy.” With an official
church, conceived as a national church, Calderón argued that any indemnification for the
disposition of the monastic properties would remain in the Philippines rather than be
siphoned off to the Vatican. This view was based on the premise that Filipino church
officials would be loyal to the Philippine state rather than to the Vatican, although exactly
how the religious orders would be controlled was not specified. In any case, with a
national church Calderón felt the country was in a position to negotiate a concordat with
the Vatican.
Interestingly, at the last minute, an “additional article” was appended to the long
list of transitory provisions in the Malolos Constitution. It stated that “All the estates,
edifices, and other property possessed by the religious corporations in these islands shall
be deemed restored to the Philippine State as of May 24, 1898 when the Dictatorial
Government has been constituted in Cavite.” Perhaps this provision on the expropriation
of friar-owned properties was added in view of the problem identified by Calderón. In
any event the Revolutionary Government was in no position to enforce it. Subsequently,
under US imperial rule that broke up the friar lands for sale to the tenants in exchange
for a hefty compensation, Calderón felt vindicated: “The fact of the matter is that . . . a
large amount of money has left the Philippine Islands and gone into the treasury of the
religious corporations” (Kalaw 1957, 247).
It should be pointed out that Mabini, despite his stance on the separation of church
and state and being a well-known Mason, was behind the concept of a national church
(Majul 1967, 169–170). In May 1898 the Junta Patriótica in Hong Kong declared that
Queremos qué la religión de los naturales y la de los que al pais vengan, sean rigurosamente
respetadas por los poderes públicos y por los individuos en particular.
Queremos que el cristianismo, base de la civilización presente, y el fundamento sólido de sus
instituciones religiosas, viva sin fuerza, ni imposiciones; y que el clero natural del pais sea el que
dirija y enseñe á aquellos naturales, en todas las jerarquías eclesiásticas.
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Queremos que el sostenimiento de ese clero se sufrague como lo acuerden los distintos gobiernos
regionales ó como lo determinen los municipios ó instituciones populares electivas, que en la
localidad funcionen. (Calderón 1907, 33)
[We want the religion of the indigenes and of those who come to the country to be strictly respected
by the public authorities and by those individuals in particular.
We want Christianity, the basis of the current civilization, and the solid foundation of their religious
institutions to subsist without force or compulsion, and the country’s native clergy to lead and teach
the people at all levels of the ecclesiastical hierarchy.
We want the maintenance of that clergy to be provided for, as the different regional governments
shall decide, or as the municipalities or popular elective institutions functioning in the locality shall
determine.]

Calderón’s inclusion of this manifesto in his memoirs suggested his cognizance of
Mabini’s desire that Catholicism and the indigenous religions be “strictly respected” (as
in Article 6, which we have seen was a nod to the reality of religious pluralism in the
Philippines); that Christianity should not be imposed on or forced upon the people; but
also that the native clergy—whose subsistence ought to be provided for by the people
through their local government units—should be the people’s pastors and occupy the full
range of the ecclesiastical hierarchy (Calderón’s Article 5). As the principal force behind
this manifesto, Mabini had expressed his patriotic desire for a Filipino to head the Catholic Church in the Philippines, “although subject to the Pope in Rome” (Majul 1967, 170).
Mabini deemed the national church, as the legitimate fruit of the revolution, should
be under the direction of the revolutionary government. From around the middle of 1898
this concept began to assume organizational form, a position that hardened as the revolution proceeded and Mabini’s influence on Aguinaldo deepened. On June 20 of that year
Aguinaldo declared all marriages invalid unless preceded by a civil wedding (Achútegui
and Bernad 1960, 61). Calderón (1907, 108) considered this decree as “anti-Catholic”
and as “doing violence to the consciences of Filipinos, nearly all of whom are Catholics”;
he also deemed it objectionable to the Filipino clergy as it violated the sacrament of
matrimony (ibid., 109). However, Aglipay supported the introduction of civil marriage,
an act that solidified his alliance with Mabini (Schumacher 1981, 70). Aguinaldo’s decree
was a sign that the state would dictate upon the church precisely because of the union of
church and state, a scenario that rather curiously Calderón kept out of his purview.
In the nineteenth century, the Patronato Real acquired specific characteristics that
provided the framework for church–state relations, which the native Filipinos would seek
to emulate. A consequence of the definitive triumph of liberalism that dismantled the
absolutist ancien régime church, the exclaustración of 1836 and 1837 dissolved the reli-
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gious orders in Spain, leaving only three seminaries under the jurisdiction of the Ministerio de Ultramar exclusively to train missionaries for overseas deployment (Aguilar
1998, 23). Thus the Spanish Philippines was one of the very few places where friar orders
could thrive. Coping with their emasculation, the friars sought to make themselves useful to the state, ultimately developing an excessive patriotism (españolismo). At the same
time, Spanish authorities increasingly treated the clergy as mere “employees of the state”
(Schumacher 1999, 2). As John Schumacher (2006, 296) put it, the Patronato Real became
“a political instrument . . . for maintaining Spanish rule over a subject people . . . an instrumentalization [of the church] not resisted by many friars seeking the advantage of their
own particular orders.” Based on this model of the Patronato Real, Aguinaldo’s government sought a far-reaching enforcement of the idea of a national church through the
appointment of Gregorio Aglipay as capellán castrense (military chaplain) sometime in
May or June 1898.
Before this appointment, Aglipay had been a parish coadjutor, particularly in San
Pablo, Laguna, when the revolution broke out in August 1896 and in Victoria, Tarlac, by
the end of that year (Achútegui and Bernad 1960, 36).15) On September 4 Aglipay, as an
official of the revolutionary government, took it upon himself to appoint a secular priest,
Fr. Eustaquio Gallardo, then parish priest of Santo Domingo, Ilocos Sur, as Provisional
Vicar General of the diocese of Nueva Segovia after the Spanish Dominican bishop had
fled the see in Vigan in mid-August because of the arrival of revolutionary forces (ibid.,
42). Aglipay’s action suggested that he deemed the authority of Aguinaldo’s civil government as sufficient basis to make an ecclesiastical appointment. However, it should be
noted that Aglipay’s ideal of church–state relations, although based on the Patronato Real,
was not entirely in accord with the historical realities of the nineteenth century and with
Aguinaldo and Mabini’s view concerning state control of the church.16) Guided by his own
patriotic zeal, Aglipay exercised his appointing power and made decisions he hoped would
15) Aglipay probably met Aguinaldo, Mabini, and Isabelo de los Reyes at San Juan de Letran when they
were students there in the early 1880s (Schumacher 1981, 69 n. 11).
16) Aglipay’s ideal of church–state relations was elucidated upon in his third manifesto of October 28,
1898 in which he stated that: (a) the church was independent of the state and must not be subordinated to it; (b) nevertheless, the cooperation of civil power was necessary for the spiritual ministry,
hence the clergy must live in harmony with the civil authority; (c) the Vatican had granted rulers
who had shown “great zeal and love for the good of the Church” the right to intervene in church
affairs, such as through the Patronato Real, but only the Pope possessed this prerogative, not the
clergy; (d) the Filipino clergy must seek from the Filipino government whatever was needed for
their work and later inform the Pope of favors received from the state in order that the Pope could
reward those services; (e) all initiative in ecclesiastical matters must come from the clergy, not the
civilian authorities; and (f) the clergy must follow and not violate church doctrine and canonical
prescriptions (Achútegui and Bernad 1960, 57–60).
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receive the Vatican’s acquiescence.
Signifying the hardening of the revolutionary government’s position, on October
20, 1898 Aglipay, while attending the Revolutionary Congress in Malolos, was elevated
to the post of Vicario General Castrense, a position that made him head of all military
chaplains in the revolution and later interpreted to mean head of all the Filipino clergy
(Schumacher 1981, 72; Achútegui and Bernad 1960, 43). In this elevated post Aglipay
sought to mobilize the Filipino clergy to support the revolutionary government, admonishing them to “harmonize [their] situation with the state of affairs created by the Revolution” (Achútegui and Bernad 1960, 56); to unite and organize themselves to take over
the reins of ecclesiastical power in the parishes and dioceses and, thereby, withdraw
adherence from Fr. Bernardino Nozaleda OP, Manila Archbishop and patriarch of the
Philippine church; and, finally, to seek canonical confirmation from Rome for the new
appointments created (ibid., 50–54).
Evidently, there were significant points of convergence between the position of
Calderón on church–state unity and Mabini’s own advocacy about a national and Filipinized church. In fact, outside of the Malolos Congress, Aguinaldo’s revolutionary government acted in ways that resonated with the Patronato Real, with Aglipay as the main
conduit to implement the revolutionary state’s policy.

Debating Church–State Relations
When the Malolos Congress returned to the issue of the state and religion in late November 1899, a vigorous debate did ensue. Deploying his oratorical skills continuously for
five hours, Tomás del Rosario explained his opposition to the unity of church and state
(Calderón 1907, Appendix CR71). In the afternoon of the same day, Manuel Gómez spoke
on behalf of the unity of church and state (ibid., Appendix CR76–78). The following day
Arcadio del Rosario, with “patent erudition,” took his turn to defend the necessity of
religious freedom. Subsequently Calderón, also a polished orator, spoke to elucidate the
reasons for his position on church–state unity (ibid., Appendix CR81). On November
24 Calderón continued his presentation, but a number of “interruptions” by Tomás del
Rosario were recorded.
In the heat of these exchanges, according to Teodoro Agoncillo (1960, 302), “one
group hurled charges and counter-charges against the other. Thus, the Calderon group
was accused of being the stooges of the friars. More cutting was the indictment that the
men carrying the burden of defending the State religion were traitors to the cause of the
Revolution.”
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The lead separationist Tomás del Rosario, for instance, emphasized that “Christianity was the best of all religions, if it had not been altered by human passions. He said that
with the doctrines of Christianity it would have been possible to establish the Universal
Republic, but religious intolerance had made it impossible” (Calderón 1907, Appendix
CR73). This statement sought to differentiate “true Christianity” in theory and in practice. In fact, Tomás del Rosario stressed that in the Philippines “the true Catholic religion
has never been preached and the teachings of Jesus Christ have been prostituted” (ibid.,
Appendix CR75). As a result, what he called “feudalismo teocrático” (theocratic feudalism)
characterized “our present religion” (ibid.). In response, Manuel Gómez argued that
Catholicism was “the most perfect” religion into which “the Filipino people” had been
born and that even though its ministers had prostituted their calling it did not “divest the
Catholic religion of its superior worth,” pointing instead to the need to distinguish human
frailties from the tenets of the faith itself (ibid., Appendix CR78). Aware of sensitivities
among Congress delegates, Tomás del Rosario stood to clarify that he did not in the least
intend to impugn Catholicism, even going to the extent of claiming that it was also his
religion (ibid., Appendix CR81). The separationists thus focused their criticisms not on
religion itself but on the faults of its ministers—reminiscent of the conventional Propagandists’ line.
Manuel Gómez argued that Catholic priests, although subject to all vices and passions, nonetheless sought the good of humanity; besides, he argued, no nation could boast
of having its members rigorously complying with all its precepts and mandates (ibid.,
Appendix CR78).17) Gómez also ruminated that, with the union of church and state, the
evil in humanity would be restrained by two coercive forces: the “internal” force through
religion and the “external” force through the state (ibid.). However, in questioning the
value of Catholicism as a state religion, Arcadio del Rosario’s riposte highlighted that
comparative statistics on crime in countries with and without a state religion did not
support the idea that a state religion made any difference in reining in human passions
(ibid., Appendix CR80). Indeed the consensus among the native elite was that the friars
themselves did not transcend their human passions.
Apart from their personal morality, the friars were widely decried for interference
in—even “usurpation of”—the affairs of the state.18) But the advocates of state religion
17) On this point Manuel Gómez was amplifying an argument advanced by the friars a few months
earlier, that is, that only a few of their ranks had “failed in their duties”; that these acts were never
tolerated, and the erring friars were corrected; and that all social groups had their own small group
of offenders. See the last-minute defense addressed to the Ultramar by the heads of the Augustinians, Franciscans, Recollects, Dominicans, and Jesuits on April 21, 1898 (Gutierrez et al. 1907; 2014).
18) For a discussion of the friar orders’ desperate attempts to salvage Spain’s rule over the Philippines
during the period 1896–98, such as the ouster of Gov.-Gen. Ramón Blanco, see Blanco (2004).
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emphasized that, with the friars’ ouster, the native clergy would take over the Philippine
church and would prove to be unlike the Spanish friars. Because of their tested patriotism, Filipino priests would not usurp governmental powers (ibid., Appendix CR94). As
far as the separationists were concerned, however, the religious minister’s nationality
was not a consideration. In advancing the first of 12 reasons why a state religion was not
acceptable, Arcadio del Rosario sounded a warning even about the native clergy: “The
ministers of a religion protected by the State usually begin the exercise of their ministries
as self-sacrificing martyrs but end as tyrants and executioners (verdugos)” (ibid., Appendix CR79).19) This blanket portrayal of church ministers demanded the ability to step
back from one’s patriotism as a Filipino, but for an advocate of church–state unity it was
not easy to countenance this radically different perspective.
For each argument in this debate a counterargument was easily found, even when
the critical gaze shifted from Catholicism to its ministers. On the basis of argumentation
alone, it was an apparent stalemate. What is more, for the protagonists the question of
church–state relations was profoundly emotional, as Tomás del Rosario acknowledged
at the outset: “it was with aversion that he would speak, since the religious question is
linked with highly venerated memories and all the legends with which we were rocked
from our cradle” (ibid., Appendix CR72).
Perhaps to create emotional distance, the separationists highlighted not local history
but European history, which they presented as pivoting around the Papacy. They trained
their intellectual armaments against papal power, even if under Spain the Vatican did not
govern the Philippine church directly but through the Spanish monarchy in the form of
the Patronato Real. In the exchange that saw Calderón defending the native clergy’s
patriotism as the source of confidence for their non-usurpation of state power, Arcadio
del Rosario countered: “Not the clergy, but the Papacy” (No es el clero, es el Pontificado)
(ibid., Appendix CR95).

Separationists and the Papacy
As the main proponent of the separation of church and state Tomás del Rosario argued
on the basis of a profound historical distrust of the Papacy, which harked back to Del
Pilar’s 1889 statement about the need to weaken the Pope. In his defense of separation,
19) Mabini would express an analogous opinion after his capture by US forces in 1900: “the interest of
the Catholic religion requires a radical change of conduct on the part of those who are to administer the Philippine parishes, be they friars or secular priests, Filipinos or Americans” (cited in
Schumacher 1981, 88).
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Tomás del Rosario presented his own take on European history to stress the long struggle of the state to free itself from the clutches of Rome, which had created a state within
a state, a social formation in which ecclesiastical power overwhelmed the state and acted
despotically.
He spoke of the errors and the constant ambitions of the Pontificate, which resulted in intolerance,
persecutions and religious wars. He dwelt on the dual dangers of public power whenever religious
power is joined with civil power. . . . He deplored the odious and military character assumed by
Catholicism, when the Popes proclaimed themselves leaders of civil government, reducing the
princes of the church to soldiers of the Pontiffs. (Calderón 1907, Appendix CR73)

He explained the Crusades as impelled by “religious fanaticism” and he discoursed on
the policy that proclaimed the Papacy as “ruler of the world” (dueño del mundo) and the
conquest of the Indies (ibid., Appendix CR74).
He examined the obstacles to the formation of a juridical community among the pueblos, which
was opposed by the Catholic Church, thereby establishing religious inequality, and the princes
were forced to accept the temporal supremacy of the Church, thus there remained a permanent
state of war. . . . He said that the Popes considered the State as a religious and ecclesiastical institution, the absorbing and irresistible apogee of the Middle Ages. (ibid.)

He went on to discuss the Reformation and the monarchs’ claim to their divine
origin to counteract the power of the Roman pontiff. He analyzed the consequences of
the Reformation, which he said “annihilated” the Roman Church and proclaimed “the
liberty of the human conscience” (ibid.). He discussed “the policies of [Cardinal] Richelieu,
who emancipated the State from ecclesiastical control, and whose diplomacy was continued by Mazarin, until religious liberty and equality of all religions had been achieved”
(ibid.). He then reviewed the “Congress of Westphalia” and discussed “the independence
of the States from ecclesiastical tutelage” (ibid., Appendix CR75).
Tomás del Rosario’s recounting of European history overdrew the Vatican’s power
and underemphasized the French Revolution and Napoleon Bonaparte. But his point was
to suggest that the newly independent Philippines should seize the opportunity brought
about by the struggles and wars in Europe that had liberated the state from Roman control. To advocate the contrary was regressive, a return to the Medieval Ages.
Supporting the view that church–state unity was repugnant was Arcadio del Rosario’s
proposition that papal power in countries without religious freedom always resulted in
intervention in civil power with disastrous results. The Philippines should not think it
could restrain the Vatican, for he pointed that France had not been able to diminish or
weaken the power of the Pope despite many concordats. It was also Arcadio del Rosario
who pointed out that in the United States, where religious freedom had reigned for “over
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a hundred years,” the Catholic Church was flourishing. In contrast, he attributed the
“decadence of Spain” primarily to “the denial of religious freedom and the consequent
preponderance of the clergy” (ibid., Appendix CR80–81).
Tomás del Rosario devoted nearly five hours of expostulations on European history,
which to him was the basis for the necessity of church–state separation. Conspicuously
absent was Philippine history. Although fully aware of his own country’s past, Tomás
del Rosario opted not to make any reference to the secularization movement and the
martyrdom of Burgos, Gómez, and Zamora. The separationists kept their distance from
an issue of vast subjective importance to members of the native elite many of them were
related by kinship to native priests.
When he finally mentioned the Philippine situation, Tomás del Rosario took the
perspective of non-Catholics, focusing on Muslims in Mindanao and Jolo “and the distinct
beliefs professed by the inhabitants of the Philippine Archipelago,” for whom, he said,
privileging the Catholic Church as a state religion would be unjust and would bring about
“serious conflicts” and “provoke a civil war” (ibid., Appendix CR75). Similarly Arcadio
del Rosario spoke of the “genuine tolerance” that prevailed in the Philippines, which
should not be reversed by adopting a state religion (ibid., Appendix CR80). This line of
reasoning recalled Del Pilar’s criticism of the decree on Rizal’s deportation to Mindanao:
“we maintain that the Philippines is composed of people with heterogeneous religions. . . .
To hold the theory that Catholicism is the national tie in the Philippines is to exclude
from Spain’s community the non-Catholic groups—those who are not even Christians
and above all the polytheists” (Del Pilar [1892] 1996, 432).

The Catholic Clergy and the Deferment of Separation
Members of the Filipino clergy attended the sessions of the Revolutionary Congress,
eagerly participating “as spectators and lobbyists” (Schumacher 1981, 82).20) According
to Majul (1967, 159), “many Filipino priests interested in the outcome of the discussions
were seen occupying seats reserved for guest[s].” They were disappointed by the turnout. The lone Catholic priest who was a member of the Revolutionary Congress, Gregorio
Aglipay “tried to have the amendment suspended” and apparently was instrumental in
persuading Mabini to do just that (ibid.; Schumacher 1981, 83).
Earlier, on October 22, 1898 Aglipay, whom Aguinaldo had appointed Vicario General
20) Over a century later, a similar scene would be replayed as members of the Filipino Catholic clergy
observed and sought to influence the deliberations in the House of Representatives over the Reproductive Health Bill in 2012.
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Castrense, had issued a circular to the Filipino clergy to indicate that the intention of the
revolutionary government was to “preserve [the Catholic religion] in all its purity” (and
presumed dominance), thus meriting the clergy’s recognition and cooperation (Majul
1967, 172). Their noncooperation could impel the revolutionary government to adopt
the separation of church and state (Schumacher 1981, 72), which in Aglipay’s view would
“gravely . . . prejudice the interests of the clergy and above all the service of religion”
(cited in Gowing 1969, 206 n. 5). The turn of events in Malolos was probably beyond
Aglipay’s expectation, for had it been he would have endeavored to be present and influence the vote. As it turned out, he was away on official business when the vote was taken
(Achútegui and Bernad 1960, 62–63).
After the triumph of the principle of separation, a number of Filipino priests petitioned Aguinaldo to preserve the Catholic Church’s position and veto the Congress’s
decision. In a memorial Fr. Mariano Garces (Calderón 1907, Appendix CR113–121)
argued that religion, as the source of morality, was the basis of society and government.
In the Philippines it had to be Catholicism because it was the religion of the majority of
Filipinos. He stated that the separation of church and state was one of the errors of
liberalism and condemned by the Popes. Moreover, religious liberty meant that people
could think of God in whatever way they wanted, giving rise to error and impiety. Garces
concluded that the triumph of the revolution was God’s handiwork; therefore, people had
to be grateful and demonstrate this gratitude by safeguarding the Catholic Church as the
state religion and prohibiting other religions.21)
The vexations caused by the approval of the provision on church–state separation
were so grave that Mabini, who personally advocated this principle, was compelled to
seek its suspension. As Calderón (ibid., 244) put it, “The religious problem was of such
tremendous implications that Mabini himself, a fierce sectarian and a Mason with serious
commitments, did not dare to accept” the principle as presented and approved by the
Revolutionary Congress.
While the debate in Malolos was going on, Mabini had warned Aguinaldo about the
fallout that could destabilize the revolutionary government:
There is now going on in Congress a heated discussion on the religious question. If you favor one
faction, then the other will separate itself from the government. . . . It is imperative that you commission a Secretary to inform Congress that, unless the times become normal, such problems
should not be discussed. . . . This is just a warning of what may happen in the future. (cited in Majul
1967, 161; cf. Schumacher 1979, 278)
21) The Catholic Church hierarchy’s claim to its centrality in society through a religious explanation of
the success of the Philippine revolution would reverberate nearly a century later in an analogous
claim regarding the 1986 People Power revolution.
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Indeed, the revolutionary government had thought it necessary to obtain the cooperation
of the native clergy in rallying the support of the masses, akin to the way the Spanish
colonial state relied on friars to prop up the rule of Spain in the islands. Earlier on July
26, 1898 Aguinaldo had ordered local officials “to call upon the patriotism of all Filipino
clergy . . . to impress upon their parishioners . . . that in order that our independence
should be secured it is necessary to give absolute adhesion to the revolutionary government and its worthy president” (cited in Majul 1967, 165).
With this apprehension, after the triumph of church–state separation, Mabini (1931,
231) as prime minister addressed a memorandum to the council of state in mid-December
1898, declaring
No es admisible en estos momentos la votada por el Congreso, por dos razones: 1.a Porque no se
pueden sostener por ahora las garantías constitucionales que establece en pro de las libertades
individuales, precisamente en los momentos en que se ha indicado la necesidad del predominio del
elemento militar; y 2.a porque no sería conveniente establecer abiertamente la separación de la
Iglesia y del Estado en estos difíciles momentos, dando motivo al retraimiento de los mantenedores
de la religión del Estado.
[The voting in Congress is inadmissible at this time for two reasons: 1. Because it is not possible
to sustain for now the constitutional guarantees that have been provided to establish individual
liberties, precisely at this time when military dominance is necessary; and 2. Because in these
difficult times it would not be appropriate to establish openly the separation of Church and State,
causing the withdrawal of those who support the State religion.]

Given the exigency of the moment, Aguinaldo would not risk alienating the Filipino
clergy and their supporters, yet he could also not veto the approved provision on church–
state separation. To stem the tide of disaffection, Aguinaldo adopted Mabini’s proposal—
conveyed to the assembly on New Year’s Day 1899—to postpone the implementation of
Title 3, Article 5, “until the official recognition of our Independence”; meanwhile, the
status quo would prevail, with the municipality concerned providing for the maintenance
of the local priest. This evasive technique was adopted into one of the constitution’s
transitory provisions.
It was astute of Aguinaldo not to court disaster by offending the clergy. Although
many native priests supported the revolution, many members of the native clergy also
remained loyal to Nozaleda—“compelled to satisfy the demands of conscience and fidelity to the Church if they were not to cut themselves off from the whole meaning of their
calling as priests” (Schumacher 1981, 69).
For their part, Aglipay’s supporters did not convene to establish a national church
until a year later in Paniqui, Tarlac (cf. ibid., 109–112). The Paniqui assembly declared
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itself independent of the Spanish ecclesiastical hierarchy, confirmed allegiance to Rome,
and vowed it would not accept any foreign bishop unless approved by native priests in a
plebiscite (Clifford 1969, 228). On April 29, 1899 Aglipay was sentenced by a tribunal
created by Nozaleda, but this move was publicized only on May 4, when the revolutionary
government was in retreat (Scott 1987, 26–28). He was excommunicated for “‘usurpation
of authority’—making ecclesiastical appointments while only an army chaplain, assuming
functions of a prelate by virtue of a civil appointment, and ordering Filipino clergy not to
obey their Spanish superiors” (ibid., 26). Nevertheless, the revolutionary government
continued to support Aglipay, who remained one of its officials, Mabini even assisting
Aglipay write his defense (Achútegui and Bernad 1960, 95–103).22)
Aglipay’s own position, along with the Filipinization of the Catholic Church, was
undermined by the approval of the separation of church and state in the Malolos Congress.
Still, the actions of Aguinaldo and Mabini, particularly in appointing Aglipay, indicated a
determination to ignore the outcome of the vote in Malolos. Although for a while some
lower officials might have prevaricated on this issue or were determinedly moderate
(Schumacher 1981, 74–78, 80–81, 86), the actions of the top leadership of the revolutionary government fitted the model of a state religion, with the civil government exercising
appointive authority in the church. At the extreme, many local government officials
harassed native parish priests and “interfered with the religious practices of the inhabitants,” although Aguinaldo sought to curb abuses and safeguard the rights of the clergy
(ibid., 80).23) These contradictions underscored the politics, tensions, and pragmatics of
attempting to build a state in the throes of war and revolution. Amid the chaos, the
revolutionary government did in fact operate on the basis of church–state unity, a vindication of Calderón’s position.

Conclusion: Conflicting Visions of National Community
In the face of how the stark options on the relations of church and state were presented
and debated in the Revolutionary Congress—and even though both sides were animated
by a shared antipathy toward the Spanish friars—it can now be understood why, in the
22) On the so-called Aglipayan schism, see Achútegui and Bernad (1960; 1966; 1971; 1972); Clifford
(1969); Scott (1987). On the cultural nationalism of the Philippine Independent Church, see Gealogo
(2010).
23) In the case of Negros Island the local revolutionary government, in staunchly favoring the separation
of church and state, issued instructions in November 1898 to limit the power of the Catholic Church
through measures such as “secularizing cemeteries” by putting them under the jurisdiction of the
respective municipalities (Fuentes 1919, 112, 121).
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absence of a middle ground, the Filipinos elites in Malolos were sharply divided.
Calderón and other proponents of church–state unity wanted to build a state on the
foundation of a “Filipino Catholic nation” that merged two distinct imagined communities:
the imagined egalitarian community of the nation within a definite territorial boundary,
on the one hand, and that of the hierarchical Catholic ecumene that was global in scope,
on the other hand. In other words, their imagined community was simultaneously nationalist and Catholic, a tricky conflation of two types of imagined communities that operated
on the basis of diametrically opposed time and space coordinates.24) To Calderón and
other supporters of state religion, this merger was unproblematic for they perceived it
as the basis of social cohesion and national unity, narrowly conceived. However, this
unity made sense at the expense of non-Catholics in Philippine society.
The imagined national community of the champions of church–state separation was
radically different from those who advocated church–state unity: they recognized a pluralist Philippines and their notion of community was inclusive of Muslims and adherents of
indigenous religious traditions. As such, their imagined community of the nation was
informed by the country’s religious heterogeneity, which justified religious freedom and
religious pluralism. This notion of community meant the effective diminution of the
Catholic Church, regarding it as just one among several religions despite the fact that it
was the religion of the majority. Proponents of separation held a deep distrust of the
Catholic Church’s officialdom, symbolized by the Papacy, the history of which they presented with their own twist. Ultimately, proponents of church–state separation were
animated by the desire to undermine ecclesiastical power because of their experiences
with the colonial Spanish church and their ideological insistence on a secular state free
from Roman interference. At the same time, because they considered the institutional
church as inherently prone to abuse, they did not consider a shift to a Filipinized church
as ground for optimism. Institutional infirmities, they believed, would corrupt church
ministers regardless of nationality. This stance left the proponents of church–state
separation at the Revolutionary Congress in Malolos with no acceptable response to the
profound desire for Filipinization of the Catholic Church. In effect, they negated the
history of the Filipino nationalist movement. Their inclusivity could not accommodate
Filipinization. Their imagined community of the nation took account of the present but
not of the past; their desired state’s historical moorings were in Europe more than on
Philippine soil.
The advocates of church–state union espoused an exclusive notion of community
24) On the distinction between national and religious communities, see the classic work of Benedict
Anderson (1991).
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that sought to do justice to the history of Filipino nationalism, while the proponents of
church–state separation advanced an inclusive notion of community but made no connection to the local history of struggle rooted in the secularization movement within the
church. Advocates of union were strong on the clamor for Filipinization of the church,
espousing a “Catholic nation,” while their opponents held to the grand idea of a secular
state buttressed by European history. One was narrowly patriotic; the other, broadly
universalist—twin but contradictory impulses that simultaneously tugged at the nation.

Epilogue: The Imposition of Separation
The question of church–state relations remained essentially unresolved—a profoundly
divisive issue at the historic juncture when Filipino elites confronted the task of defining
their vision of national community and the type of state they wanted to erect. However,
for the sake of political expediency the short-lived Malolos Republic maintained the unity
of church and state. Amid the exigencies of the moment, it opted to retain Catholicism
as the state religion on the model of church–state union under the Patronato Real of the
nineteenth century. It would take the American imperial occupation of the Philippines
to settle the issue that the Filipino elites could not resolve.
The US colonial policy on church–state separation was first enunciated on July 6,
1900 by Major Gen. Elwell Stephen Otis who, as military governor, pledged that “As
under the Constitution of the United States complete freedom is guaranteed, and no
minister of religion can be interfered with or molested in following his calling in a peaceful and lawful manner, and there must be a complete separation of Church and State”
(Gowing 1969, 209). Animated by the First Amendment, the principles of religious
freedom and church–state separation were confirmed in the Organic Act (or Cooper Act)
passed by the US Congress in 1902 (also known as the Philippine Bill of 1902), which
provided the framework of government in the Philippines until its replacement by the
Jones Law of 1916. Section 5 of this legislation declared: “That no law shall be made
respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, and that
the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed.”25)
Despite this avowed US policy, at the outset there was a period of confusion on the
part of some Filipinos, who represented the separationist position in Malolos, because
25) American Catholics “generally favored” the application of these principles to the Philippines,
“though they vigorously warned the Protestants of the futility of sending missionaries to a land as
devoutly Catholic as the Philippines” (Gowing 1969, 210).
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of how the US seemingly favored the friars. The 1898 Treaty of Paris bound the US to
protect friars and other Spanish subjects, respect property rights of the Catholic Church,
and indemnify the church for war-inflicted damages to ecclesiastical property (ibid.,
207–208). This working out of the US policy of separation, which extended protection
to the church, its ministers, and properties, was based on the “friendly” separation that
then prevailed in the United States, which was beyond the ken of the separationists in
Malolos whose stance indicated “hostile” separation. Based on their limited grasp of how
an independent Philippines would relate to Rome, Filipino elites on both sides of the
debate were also not attuned to the political maneuvering that the United States had to
play with the Vatican.
Soon, however, Filipino elites began to grasp the US policy on church–state separation and the colonial government’s adherence to it. The Catholic Church was clearly
disestablished as it no longer received state funds nor controlled public education; priests
qua priests no longer held positions in the government; the state had no authority to
make appointments in the ecclesiastical hierarchy; and Protestants were free to proselytize and establish their own churches. Most significantly, because the US considered
discontent in the friar estates a major cause of the Philippine revolution, it insisted on
the redistribution of these properties to which the Vatican agreed albeit subject to
“consultation” with the religious orders. A long period of haggling ensued, with the
Dominicans, Recollects, and Augustinians resorting to machinations and “intrigues”
(as in the nineteenth century) “in an effort to realize greater profits for themselves,”
as Antolin Uy (2001, 172) put it. Eventually the agreement was signed in December
1903, resulting in the partition of these monastic estates to the benefit mainly of wealthy
Filipinos (Endriga 1970; Escalante 2002; cf. Connolly 1992). Despite limitations, the
American policy effectively dismantled the friar lands and the friar orders lost their
powerbase in the Philippine countryside.
Spain’s loss of the Philippine islands logically suggested the cessation of the
Patronato Real, which the Vatican acknowledged in December 1902 through Leo XIII’s
promulgation of the Quae Mari Sinico (Gowing 1969, 218; Uy 2001, 171). This Bull
suppressed the ancient privileges of the religious orders. However, the Vatican refused
to order the withdrawal of the friars from the Philippines, although it acquiesced to an
informal agreement with the US for their voluntary expatriation (Gowing 1969, 215). At
the start of the revolution against Spain in 1896, there were 1,124 friars in the country.
During the fighting most of them escaped to Manila, but about 300 were taken prisoner
and about 50 were killed (ibid., 204).26) By December 1903 only 246 friars remained; they
26) Many friars were publicly beaten. In some places as in Cavite, “thirteen were savagely put to death, ↗
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were either too old or infirm to return to parish work or just plain realistic to confine
themselves to educational institutions in Manila, Cebu, and Vigan (ibid., 217). With
schools as their new powerbase given their reduced personnel, the friar orders were
permitted by the United States to remain in the Philippines without being perceived as
a threat to the social order. However, the leadership of the friar orders remained in
Spanish hands, who decided to relocate their headquarters to Spain.27) The Vatican subsequently moved to replenish the depleted stock of Spanish clergy with American and
other European clergy. Religious congregations with no prior engagement in the Philippines started to set up shop for the first time in the country.28)
US intervention and agreement with the Vatican also ensured that, under US rule,
the Filipinization of the Catholic Church would not happen in any substantial way. In
effect, the Catholic Church in the Philippines remained a largely colonial institution. Most
parishes were indeed passed on to Filipino priests for lack of alternative personnel, and
this might have pleased the proponents of Filipinization. But the church’s upper echelon
was a different story. By 1906 four of the five episcopal sees in the Philippines were
held by American bishops, with Fr. Jorge Barlin being named the only Filipino bishop,
who was assigned to Nueva Caceres (ibid., 218; Uy 2001, 180). The appointment of
American bishops “was resented by Filipinos, who wished to see Filipino clergy raised
to the episcopate in their own country” (Gowing 1969, 218). To appease this resentment,
↘ one by being burned alive, another by being hacked to pieces, and still another by being roasted
on a bamboo pole” (Gowing 1969, 204). In Schumacher’s (1976, 401–405; 1981, 49–51) opinion,
Aguinaldo was not anticlerical and he allowed the friar parish priest of Kawit to flee and treated the
captured friars with courtesy; in contrast, Bonifacio, with Mariano Alvarez’s consent, ordered the
execution of friars and other Spanish prisoners, an act that Aguinaldo publicly condemned.
27) The headquarters of Augustinian operations in the Philippines was moved to Madrid in 1901, returned
to Manila in 1927, but moved back to Spain in 1935. For most of the twentieth century Spaniards
comprised the handful of Augustinians in the Philippines. “Native vocations” did not begin until
the 1950s. In 1980 natural-born Filipinos accounted for 29 of the 59 Augustinians, although 11
Spaniards had undergone naturalization as Filipino citizens (Augnet 2010). The administration of
the Philippine province of the Franciscans was transferred to Madrid in 1905, leaving behind a
Provincial Commissariat to oversee the remaining activities. By 1948 23 Spanish Franciscans
remained in the Philippines (Gutay c. 2007). The Dominican Province of Our Lady of the Most Holy
Rosary remained in Spanish control with its seat in Avila, a Filipino Dominican Province being
established only in 1971 (Dominican Province of the Philippines 2014). Interestingly only the
Society of Jesus and the SVD have produced historians (principally Fr. John Schumacher SJ and Fr.
Antolin Uy SVD) who have studied the nineteenth century critically.
28) The Irish Redemptorists and the British Mill Hill Missionaries both arrived in 1906; the Dutch
and Belgian priests of the Congregation of the Immaculate Heart of Mary (CICM, Congregatio
Immaculati Cordis Mariae) in 1907; the Dutch Missionaries of the Sacred Heart (MSC, Missionarii
Sacratissimi Cordis) in 1908; the German Society of the Divine Word (SVD, Societas Verbi Divini)
in 1909; and the American, plus a handful of English-speaking European, Brothers of the Christian
Schools (FSC, Fratres Scholarum Christianarum) in 1911.
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three years later two more Filipinos attained episcopal rank: Pablo Singzon for Calbayog
and Juan Gorordo for Cebu (Uy 2001, 180)—token gestures to pacify the clamor for
Filipinization.
In analyzing this episode, Peter Gowing (1969, 218) suggestively commented that
these appointments “proved to be a wise move. The American bishops were able to give
leadership in a time when the Roman Catholic Church was adjusting to the new condition
of separation of church and state in the islands and could no longer look to the civil
authorities to support its policies, enforce its regulations, and provide all the other benefits of ‘patronage.’” By implication, the Filipino clergy by and large remained trapped
in the tradition of church–state unity under Spain and could have been troublesome to
the American colonial authorities.29)
As far as the new imperial ruler was concerned, the prime see of Manila was definitely outside of Filipino hands. Because the Catholic Church remained a powerful
institution, although far from what it was like during the Spanish period, the United States
would not risk having it under a Filipino. Leadership of the Philippine church was crucial,
even if the Vatican through Quae Mari Sinico had proscribed the clergy in the Philippines
from engaging in political activity (ibid., 215; Clifford 1969, 245). If any consolation,
Nozaleda was the last of the friar-archbishops; all subsequent archbishops of Manila
belonged to the secular clergy. The Archbishop of Manila from 1903 to 1916 was
Jeremiah J. Harty, an American whose previous assignment was in Missouri. Succeeding
him was Michael J. O’Doherty, an Irish, who served as bishop of Zamboanga starting in
1911 when the diocese was created and, prior to coming to the Philippines, had been
rector of the Irish College in Salamanca, Spain, for seven years. At ease with both Hispanic and Anglo-American cultures, O’Doherty held the archbishopric of Manila lengthily from 1916 until his death in 1949, outlasting formal US rule of the Philippines.30)
Despite their ethnicities, these archbishops presided over a church that remained predominantly Spanish, unable to come to terms with US colonial rule as well as connect
meaningfully with Filipinos who spoke the local languages and, increasingly, English.
Indeed, as the American period wore on, most of the Filipino clergy continued to
be steeped in Hispanic language and outlook, forever longing for the Spanish past and
perpetuating this nostalgia in Spanish-language seminaries (Schumacher 2009). The
29) Certainly there were exceptions; most notable were Frs. Mariano Sevilla and Manuel Roxas who
in the early 1900s championed Filipinization while accepting church–state separation (Schumacher
1981, 245–247).
30) O’Doherty was succeeded by Gabriel M. Reyes, the first Filipino Archbishop of Manila who was
elevated to the post in October 1949. But Reyes died soon after becoming archbishop, and the
archbishopric was handed to Rufino J. Santos, Archbishop of Manila from 1953 to 1973.
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church was colonial in an out-of-sync way. Like the Filipino clergy who lobbied against
the outcome in Malolos, this “Hispanicized clergy in an Americanized country” repudiated the separation of church and state, an attitude that prevailed until the 1950s, as
Schumacher (ibid., 257) perceptively observed. In fact, from the mid-1940s onwards,
in defending their interests in education against perceived nationalist threats, Catholic
bishops began to make pronouncements that since then have fostered the imaginary of
a “Catholic nation,” based on a conflation of the body Catholic and the body politic
(Francisco 2014), with all the contradictions already evident at the end of the nineteenth
century. Thus was made into a holy grail the vision of national community that in Malolos
Calderón championed, Mabini devised, and Aglipay executed.
Accepted: February 18, 2015
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